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ABSTRACT
The aim of this technical report is to provide a detailed and critical review of the
suitability of the en commandite partnership for tax structuring both generally and
specifically. The report takes cognisance of the requirements that a financial
institution might consider in its determination of the utility of the en commandite
partnership as a tax structuring tool in a structured or corporate finance
environment.
The report begins with an overview of the primarily legal requirements for the
creation of a valid partnership.
It then considers specifically whether the en commandite partnership is able to take
the place of the 'Lessor Trust Arrangement' and researches specific issues
germane to the enquiry.
Specific legislation dealing with en commandite partnerships is then researched
and includes a commentary on the provisions of s 24H and s 8(5)(a) of the Income
Tax Act.
Practical examples of the use of the en commandite partnership are then
considered which challenges the concept of traditional loan finance and suggests
the capital contribution as a tax efficient alternative.
A consideration of the possibility of a challenge under the anti-avoidance provisions
of the Income Tax Act concludes the report.
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In the competitive world of corporate and structured finance, financial institutions
are constantly looking for innovative structures for their clients. These structures
may be developed as 'off-the-shelf' packages or may be tailored specifically to the
needs of a particular client. In either event, the primary objective of these packages
is to reduce the after-tax cost of funding for the client. In order to achieve this
objective, financial institutions may use a variety of 'tax tools', which are
mechanisms used to reduce tax (for example, dividends on preference shares
might be used as opposed to interest being repaid on conventional loan funding) or
'tax vehicles', which refers to the body that is used to house the income, allowances
etcetera (for example, a private company is taxed at the corporate rate of 300/0
whereas an individual is taxed on a marginal basis up to 45%). These tax tools and
tax vehicles may be used alone or in combination to achieve the objectives sought.
(In this paper these concepts shall be referred to generically as tax tools.)
The aim of this paper is to consider the suitability of the en commandite partnership
as a tax structuring tool. In order to do this it is necessary to have a thorough
understanding of the en commandite partnership,
• its tax treatment,
• flexibility (no client wants to get 'locked into' a structure that is difficult to
unwind),
• its ability to combine with other tax tools, and
• its ability to be used as part of a greater tax plan.
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The word partnership comes from the Latin word 'partiarius' which means 'one who
shares with another' and this concept of sharing and participation forms the basis of
the South African law of partnership. A partnership may be defined as ' a legal
relationship arising from a contract between two or more persons, usually not
exceeding twenty, each to contribute to a business or undertaking carried on in
common, with the object of making and sharing profits'.1
History of the Partnership
Partnership as a concept began along with co-operative economic endeavour and
was largely based upon family lines. The concept received much attention from the
Romans, who distinguished between various kinds of partnerships and whose
understanding of the partnership as a consensual contract of the utmost good faith
between the parties still prevails today.2
Commentators of the Roman Law of partnership in many jurisdictions have
accepted the concept of mutual agency and solidary liability for partnership
obligations. In many jurisdictions, but not South Africa, the partnership has been
accepted as a legal persona separate and distinct from the partners of which it is
comprised.
The en commandite partnership had its beginnings in Italy during the mediaeval
period. The commenda was an arrangement in terms whereof a capitalist
(commendator) entrusted capital to a trader (commendatarius) for employment in
2
Henning and Delport: The South African Law of Partnership, An Extract from The Law of South
Africa in para 361.
Henning and Delport supra in para 362.
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mercantile enterprises on the understanding that the commendator, while not in
name a party to the enterprise and though entitled to a share of the profits, would
not be liable for losses beyond the amount of his contribution. This concept of
limiting the liability of non-managing investors spread from Italy into French
commercial law where it emerged as the societe en commandite, and which then
was incorporated into Roman Dutch law under its French name.3
In the absence of a modern partnership code the South African law of partnership
derives from South African Common Law which is based primarily on the Roman
Dutch Law. The most relevant commentary on partnership in Roman Dutch Law
was that written by the French jurist Pothier towards the end of the eighteenth
century and which has been accepted by the courts as an important authority in this
branch of the law.4 Pothier described the en commandite partnership as follows:5
'Partnership en commandite is that which a trader enters into with a private person
(a person not in trade) for a trade to be carried on in the name of the trader only,
and to which the other contracting party contributes only a certain sum of money
which he brings into the capital of the partnership under an agreement that he is to
have a certain share of the profits if there be any, and to bear, in the contrary event,
the same share of the losses, in which, nevertheless, he will only be bound to the




Henning and Delport supra in para 362.
Pothier R J: A Treatise on the Contract of Partnership with the Civil Code and Code of
Commerce Relating to that Subject in the Same Order - translated from the French with notes
referring to decisions of the English Courts by 0 D Tudor London Butterworths 1854 Reprint
Durban, BUtterworths 1970
Referred to by Bale CJ in S Butcher and Sons v Baranov Bros (1905) 26 NLR 589 at 592-593.
The passage referred to is Pothier 6 3 106.
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In Roman Dutch Law there were various kinds of partnership distinguishable with
reference to duration, purpose etcetera but in South African law the main distinction
has been between ordinary and extraordinary partnerships.
In ordinary partnerships all the partners are joint co-creditors and joint co-debtors
vis-a-vis outsiders whereas in the extraordinary partnership one, or some, of the
partners occupy the position of partners only in so far as their co-partners are
concerned, but not vis-a-vis outsiders. Extraordinary partners are not liable to third
parties for partnership debts as long as they do not act or hold themselves out to
outsiders as ordinary partners, in which event they become liable as such.6
Three types of extraordinary partnerships existed in South African law prior to the
passing of the pre-Union Statute Law Revision Act, 36 of 1976. These were
• the partnership en commandite,
• the anonymous (silent) partnership,
• and the limited partnership.
The first two types were known to Roman-Dutch Law and the third kind was
introduced by statute in the Cape Province? and Natal,8 but proved unpopular and
has since been repealed. 9
The anonymous or silent partnership is created where parties agree to share the





Henning and Delport supra in para 367.
The Special Partnerships Limited Liability Act 24 of 1861 (Cape) as amended by the Special
Partnerships' Limited Liability Amendment Act 12 of 1906 (Cape).
The Special Partnerships Limited Liability Act of 1864 (Law 1 of 1865 Natal).
Pre-Union Statute Law Revision Act 36 of 1976.
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while the partners whose names are not disclosed remain the anonymous or silent
partners, sometimes also referred to as sleeping or dormant partners. The essence
of this arrangement is that the existence of the silent partner should be concealed
from the outside world. The silent partner, however, does not receive limited
liability in that he remains liable to the other partners for the liabilities of the
partnership pro rata to the profit share arrangement agreed between the parties.
The en commandite partnership is similar to the anonymous partnership in that the
existence of the undisclosed partner (called a commanditarian partner or partner
en commandite) must be concealed from the outside world for the commanditarian
partner to retain the benefits of the partnership, however, the extent of his liability in
the event of loss in the partnership is limited to an agreed capital contribution that
he has made to the partnership.
The following characteristics of the commanditarian partner and the anonymous
partner are common:
• Both are undisclosed partners, which means that they are not held out to the
world as being partners. In terms of the Business Names Act 27 of 1960 s 1
and s 3 state that the names and particulars of a 'special partner', defined as
the anonymous partners in an anonymous partnership and as a commanditarian
partner in a partnership en commandite, need .not be disclosed in any trade
catalogue, trade circular, business letter, order for goods or statement of
account.
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• They are not liable for partnership debts to creditors of the partnership, but only
to their co-partners. The mere fact that outsiders become aware or are
informed of the nature and terms of the partnership does not render them liable
to partnership creditors. They only lose their protection against a liability of this
nature where they actually have acted as, or held themselves out to be, ordinary
partners.
• They may not participate actively in the business of the partnership. It has been
held that mere interference does not by itself constitute an active participation in
the business that would make them liable to creditors, provided that they do not
actively hold themselves out to be partners of the partnership.10 In
Roman Dutch Law a partnership en commandite could validly be contracted on
the condition that the managing partner take heed of the advice of the other
partner in matters effecting the partnership.
• They cannot claim repayment of their contributions or payment of their share of
the partnership profits in competition with the creditors of the partnership.
In the event that there is confusion as to the status of the partnership the courts will




Henning and Delport supra in para 367.
In Barker & Co v Blore 1908 TS 1156 in 1158-9 Wessels J stated the following: 'The Court will
always interpret a deed of partnership in favour of its being an ordinary partnership, rather than in
favour of its being an anonymous partnership or a partnership en commandite',
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Chapter 2
Characteristics of Partnerships in General and En
Commandite Partnerships Specifically
Formation of Partnership
A partnership is formed when the partners conclude a valid partnership agreement.
There are no formal requirements that must be met to form a partnership and the
agreement can thus be oral or in writing, but it is a requirement that it is an express
agreement containing clarity on all the issues affecting the partnership.12 Thus it
has been held that where two parties had entered into negotiations regarding the
formation of a partnership and had a partnership deed finalised but not signed, the
one party had contributed money to the other and the business was in existence
that a partnership had not been formed. 13 It is not clear from the authorities that an
en commandite partnership is required to be reduced to writing in order to make it
valid. In S. Butcher & Sons v Baranov Bale CJ stated the following:
'It appears that the French Ordonnance of Commerce of 1673 required that every
partnership, whether general or en commandite, should be reduced to writing. This
requirement is mentioned by Mr Justice Cope in Cato v Aldridge, but it had fallen
into desuetude and is no longer required by our law, because ordinary partnership
may be constituted by verbal agreement, and may be inferred from the acts of the
party sought to be bound.'
12
13
S Butcher & Sons v Baranov Bros supra at 592.
S Butcher & Sons v Baranov Bras supra at 592.
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It can thus be concluded that the partnership en commandite need not be reduced
to writing for it to be valid, but taking into account the inclination of the courts to find
in favour of a partnership not being a partnership en commandite in the event of
their being any confusion as to the issue, it is strongly recommended that the
en commandite partnership should, for evidentiary purposes, be reduced to writing.
Partnership Subject to Condition
The establishment of a partnership can be made subject to a condition.14 This is
especially important for financial institutions wishing to go into partnership with
clients and who do not want to find themselves in partnership with a client before all
the security and other requirements are fulfilled.
The parties may also agree on a date upon which the partnership would come into
effect, thus aiding the partnership as a tool for tax structuring.
Legal Personality
A partnership does not have perpetual succession. It ceases to exist when the
members of the partnership change. If the partners agree to continue then they in
effect form a new partnership. This may have negative consequences for the
financial institution seeking to remove itself from partnerships that it has formed with
clients, or seeking to change partners, as it may be considered that in so doing
there has been a transfer of assets from the one partnership to the newly
constituted partnership, and the consequence of there arising transfer duties on
14 Shapiro v Roth 1911 WLD 43.
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property, market securities tax on shares, value added tax and the like needs to be
researched. This paper later briefly looks at these possible consequences but is
primarily concerned with only the income tax consequences of the partnership.
Ownership of Business Assets
The assets are contributed to the partnership by the partners and they own these
assets jointly in undivided shares. Upon the dissolution of the partnership the
partnership property is returned to the partners to the extent of their original
contribution or as agreed to in terms of the deed of partnership. Individual partners
cannot deal with partnership property without the authority of the partnership.
Business Owners
A partnership must consist of at least two partners and not more than twenty
partners (except for certain professional partnerships that are allowed to have more
than twenty partners).15 The partners may be natural or legal persons and in
ordinary partnerships there would be no distinction between the partners, whereas
extraordinary partnerships have different classes of partner, for example, disclosed
and non-disclosed partners, commanditarian and disclosed partner etcetera.
Management
The partners manage the partnership and the rights and duties of these partners is
set out in a partnership agreement which can either be in writing or oral. In
15
In terms of s 30(1) of the Companies Act 1973 no partnership may exceed twenty partners
unless incorporated in terms of that Act.
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en commandite partnerships and anonymous partnerships the undisclosed or
commanditarian partners do not take part in the management of the company.
Representation
A partnership acts through its partners and thus any partner in an ordinary
partnership has implied authority to act on behalf of the partnership as agent and to
bind the partnership provided that he acts within the scope of the business of the
partnership.
A partner's act can be authorised or ratified where he has acted beyond the scope
of his authority. Generally any partner in an ordinary partnership can represent the
partnership. In an en commandite partnership only the disclosed partner may
represent the partnership.
Capital Contributions
It is a fundamental of the 'sharing' aspect of partnerships that all partners contribute
something to the partnership, this may be in the form of money, property or
services. In en commandite partnerships the capital contribution forms the basis of
the extent of the commanditarian partner's liability, and is thus of utmost
importance.
Distribution of Profits
The partners can agree on the profit share to be split amongst them in terms of the
partnership agreement. In theory partners may not pay themselves a salary,
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however, in practise partners may agree to drawings accruing to each of them,
which drawings are equivalent to salary, the understanding being that the partners
agree that one partner will be entitled to draw an amount from available profits
before the balance is distributed in terms of the profit sharing ratio, and that, to the
extent that profits are not available to allow that partner to draw these funds, the
other partner agrees to contribute that amount to the partnership.
In terms of accounting practice the partners normally become entitled to the net
profits at the end of each accounting period, however, for purposes of normal tax
they are taxed in their personal capacities as partners and thus the profits of the
partnership accrue to them as and when such profits accrue to the partnership
itself.
Disposal or Transfer of Interests
A partner may not transfer his interest in a partnership unless all the partners
expressly agree to the transfer and upon this happening the partnership is
terminated and a new one is constituted in its place.
Liability to Creditors
In ordinary partnerships the partners are all jointly and severally liable to creditors,
however, in en commandite partnerships the commanditarian partner is not liable to
creditors provided that he has not held himself out as a partner to that party. In the
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case of S Butcher & Sons v Baranov Bras Bale CJ considered the phrase 'holding
out' and summarised the law as follows: 16
'In his observation on the phrase "holding out", Lindley (Partnership 4th Ed. Bk.1,
Ch.1, Sec. 2 p. 149) cites Lord Wensleydale in Dickenson v. Valpy (10 B. and
C., 140) as saying "If it could have been proved that the defendant had held himself
out to be a partner, not to the world, for that is a loose expression, but to the plaintiff
himself, or under such circumstances of publicity as to satisfy a jury that the plaintiff
knew of it and believed him to be a partner, he would be liable to the plaintiff in all
transactions in which he engaged, and gave credit to the defendant upon the faith of
his being such partner. The defendant would be bound by an indirect
representation to the plaintiff arising from his conduct as much as if he had stated to
him directly and in express terms that he was a partner, and the plaintiff had acted
upon that statement." In Story on Partnership (7th Ed. Sec.55) the same principles
are well illustrated in a note citing an American case "To charge a defendant with
liability as a partner on the ground of representation of himself as a partner, it must
be proved either that he has represented himself as a partner to the plaintiff, or has
made or allowed to be made such a public representation of himself in that
character as to lead the jury to conclude that the plaintiff, knowing of that
representation, and believing the defendant to be a partner, gave him credit under
that belief.
'No person can be fixed with liability on the ground that he has been held out as a
partner, unless two things concur, viz, first, the alleged act of holding out must have
been done either by him or by his consent, and secondly, it must have been known
to the person seeking to avail himself of it. In the absence of the first of these
requisites, whatever may have been done cannot be imputed to the person sought
to be made liable; and in the absence of the second, the person seeking to make
him liable has not in any way been misled.'
In this case it was held on the above authority that where a disclosed partner
sought to receive credit facilities from the plaintiff and disclosed the existence of the
commanditarian partner in the hope that this would lead to the partnership being
16
(1905) 26 NLR 589 at 601-602.
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considered more creditworthy, that as the commanditarian partner had not made
the disclosure and had not consented to such disclosure, that it did not lose the
protection of the limited liability.
Audit
An audit of the financial statements of a partnership is not required by law.
Accounting Requirements
A partnership is not required to keep specific accounting records in terms of South
African law. Under the common law, however, a partner who controls partnership
assets must keep and render accounts annually to the partnership.
Insolvency
Upon insolvency the partners' estates will be sequestrated or liquidated unless a
solvent partner assumes the liability to pay the creditors. Commanditarian partners
in an en commandite partnership will not be required to pay anything more than
their capital contribution.
Taxpayer
A partnership does not form a separate taxable entity for normal tax purposes and
thus the partners are taxed on the profits accruing to them in terms of the
partnership agreement in their personal capacities, whether or not there has been a
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distribution. Furthermore they are able to claim deductions and allowances in their
personal capacities.
Year of Assessment
The year of assessment for normal tax will be the end of February for individuals
and where companies are involved, their specific financial year-end.
Provisional Tax
Individuals in partnership are required to register as provisional taxpayers and will
consequently be required to pay provisional tax on the profits accruing to them in
the partnership.
Retained Earnings
As partnership earnings accrue in the hands of the partner for tax purposes when
they in fact accrue to the partnership, there is no taxation on the retention of
earnings within the partnership. When they are subsequently paid over to the
partner (he has already been taxed on that amount as at the date that it accrued to
the partnership generally), they are received by him as a receipt or an accrual of a
capital nature.
Tax Losses
Tax losses are deductible by the partners in the determination of their taxable
incomes in their profit sharing ratios. Assessed losses may be carried forward and
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are not lost when partners who are natural persons cease to trade. Assessed
losses of a corporate partner will be lost if it ceases to trade for a year.
Deduction for Salaries to Partners
A salary paid to a partner constitutes an advance against partnership profits and is
not tax deductible in the partnership's hands because it is not a separate taxpayer.
The partnership is only entitled to a deduction for salaries paid to its employees.
Stamp Duty
A written partnership agreement attracts a stamp duty of R10 which is payable by
the affixing and defacing of revenue stamps to the value of R10 on the signed
original deed of partnership.17
Transfer Duty
Depending on the constitution of the partnership transfer duty will either be levied at
rates applying to natural persons or corporate entities when a partnership
purchases immovable property. Where an en commandite partnership consists of
a combination of corporate and natural persons then the transfer duty would be
levied in accordance with the identity of the disclosed partner.
17
Item 17 of Schedule 1 to Act No. 77 of 1968.
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Chapter 3
Can the En Commandite Partnership take the Place of the
Lessor Trust
Introduction
Financial Institutions developed a product, which is described below, called,
amongst other things, the 'Lessor Trust Arrangement'. This product was widely
marketed and proved popular with clients, many of whom became participants in
the 'Lessor Trust Arrangement'.
Unfortunately a change in legislation has now terminated the efficacy of the
'Lessor Trust Arrangement' and financial institutions are now researching the
development of a suitable alternative to the 'Lessor Trust Arrangement' which offers
similar benefits.
The main thrust of this paper is to ascertain the viability of the en commandite
partnership as a tax structuring tool generally. Within this framework it would be
beneficial to consider the use of the en commandite partnership as a replacement
for the 'Lessor Trust Arrangement' as this would ensure that those aspects of the
en commandite partnership needing to be considered for purposes of tax
structuring, have been properly considered.
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Mechanics of the 'Lessor Trust Arrangement' Sought to be Replaced
A lessor trust would be formed with a financial institution as the initial vested
income beneficiary and the client as the vested capital beneficiary.
The trust would purchase the assets sought to be financed from a supplier (or client
where there was a re-financing) with funds borrowed from the financial institution.
The trust would then lease the assets to the client for a period of five years (or
whatever period was required to take full advantage of the capital allowances in
respect of the asset).
The financial institution might be the founder of the trust and would be the
controlling trustee. This would give it the flexibility to agree to changes in
beneficiary etcetera.
The financial institution would then make capital contributions to the trust of the
after-tax value of any assessed losses that it might enjoy as a beneficiary of the
trust.
At the end of the period the income beneficiary would be substituted by the capital
beneficiary and the client would then have the option of either
• retaining ownership of the asset in the trust, or
• causing a distribution of assets to the capital beneficiary to take place (and so
terminating the trust).
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In either event it would seem that the recoupment provisions of s 8(4)(a) would be
avoided.
Income Tax Consequences of the 'Lessor Trust Arrangement'
In terms of s 258 of the Income Tax Act (the Act) the trust would act as a conduit
and all income, expenditure and allowances would be recognised in the hands of
the vested income beneficiary. Section 25 8(2) states the following:
'(1) Any income received by or accrued to or in favour of any person in his
capacity as the trustee of a trust referred to in the definition of "person" in section 1,
shall, subject to the provisions of section 7, to the extent to which such income has
been derived for the immediate or future benefit of any ascertained beneficiary with
a vested right to such income, be deemed to be income which has accrued to such
beneficiary, and to the extent to which such income is not so derived, be deemed to
be income which has accrued to such trust.
'(2) Where a beneficiary has acquired a vested right to any income referred to
in sub-section (1) in consequence of the exercise by the trustee of a discretion
vested in terms of the relevant deed of trust, agreement or will of a deceased
person, such income shall for the purposes of that subsection be deemed to have
been derived for the benefit of such beneficiary.
'(3) Any deduction or allowance which may be made under the provisions of
this Act in the determination of the taxable income derived by way of any income
referred to in subsection (1) shall, to the extent to which such income is under the
provisions of that subsection deemed to be income which has accrued to a
beneficiary or to the trust, be deemed to be a deduction or allowance which may be
made in the determination of the taxable income derived by such beneficiary or
trust, as the case may be.'
In terms of the above deeming provision the rentals earned by the trust would be
deemed to be income in the hands of the vested income beneficiary.
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Likewise the deductions and capital allowances would be deductible in the hands of
the income beneficiary.
The financial institution would derive the benefit of any tax loss arising in the trust,
subject to the provisions of s 23A of the Act which limits the allowances claimable
by a lessor to the taxable income derived from the lessor's 'rental income' as
defined in s 23A of the Act.
The client would be able to deduct the rentals payable to the trust for the asset in
terms of the general deduction formula set out in s 11 (a) and thus would be in the
same position that it would have been in for the purposes of the tax treatment of its
financing requirements except that the trust, upon receiving the capital allowances
would be able to reduce the amount of the rentals charged to the extent of the
capital contributions made. This would place the client in an advantageous position
in that he would be receiving a reduced financing rate and would receive the asset
at the end of the period as a distribution to the capital beneficiary.
This 'Lessor Trust Arrangement' had favourable consequences for the client who
could sell an asset already owned by him to a trust over which he retained a
measure of control (by way of the trust deed and the appointment of the client as a
trustee) and which he was assured he would receive by way of capital distribution
upon dissolution of the trust.
In the interim the financial institution would claim the capital allowances that the
client would otherwise have received. Provided that the financial institution had
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taxable income against which it could claim the capital allowances, it would make
an adjustment in either the interest rate charged to the Trust, or where a lease was
contemplated, by a reduction of the rental charged for the asset financed. In some
cases a 'Capital Contribution Agreement' was entered into which generally referred
to a 'computer model' which would calculate the exact after tax benefit received by
the financial institution and would require the financial institution to make payment
of a large portion of this amount as a 'tax base contribution' to the trust, the balance
remaining with the financial institution as its 'tax base contribution fee'. The use of
any of these mechanisms would ensure a lower effective rate of financing to the
trust which would be passed through to the client in the rate charged by the trust to
the client.
The 'Lessor Trust Arrangement' was especially effective with clients that were in
assessed loss positions but were not willing to hire the goods directly from the
financial institution, for whatever reason. It also had popularity with clients that
were in assessed loss positions and preferred to receive a reduction in their funding
costs by way of a reduced financing rate than to claim the capital allowances
themselves which merely resulted in them receiving an increased assessed loss.
Obviously a reduced funding cost would give the client an immediate cash flow
benefit which would be more valuable than an increased tax assessed loss.
Furthermore, the payments to the trust in terms of the rental/lease would be fully
deductible in the hands of the client.
There was also a benefit in that upon distribution of the asset to the capital
beneficiary there would be no recoupment in terms of s 8(4). From the beginning of
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the transaction the asset was held on behalf of the capital beneficiary and thus the
distribution would merely pass formal ownership to the legitimate owner.
Unfortunately for the taxpayer who had requirements that would have made the
Lessor Trust Arrangement an ideal vehicle for financial planning, the Legislature
amended the Income Tax Act in terms of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 30 of
1998 to provide for a 'ring-fencing' of the allowances. It amends section 258 of the
Act by the addition of the following subsections:
'(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (3), any deduction or allowance
contemplated in that subsection which is deemed to be made in the determination
of the taxable income of a beneficiary of a trust during any year of assessment shall
be limited to the income which is deemed to be income which has accrued to such
beneficiary in terms of subsection (1) during such year of assessment.
'(5) The amount by which the sum of the deductions and allowances contemplated
in subsection (4) exceeds the income contemplated in that subsection, shall be
deemed to be a deduction or allowance which may be made in the determination of
the taxable income of the trust during such year of assessment: Provided that the
sum of such deductions and allowances shall be limited to the taxable income of
such trust during such year of assessment as calculated before allowing any
deduction or allowance under this subsection.
'(6) The amount by which the sum of the deductions and allowances contemplated
in subsection (4) exceeds the sum of the income contemplated in subsection (4) of
such beneficiary and the taxable income of such trust contemplated in subsection
(5) shall for the purposes of subsection (3) be deemed to be a deduction or
allowance which may be made in the determination of the taxable income derived
by such beneficiary by way of income referred to in subsection (1) during the
immediately succeeding year of assessment.'
The new subsections are deemed to have come into operation on 11 March 1998
and apply in respect of
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• any new trust created on or after 11 March 1998; and
• any existing trust, with effect from years of assessment commencing on or after
1 January 1999.
The effect of the above amendments is to 'ring-fence' the allowances available to a
vested income beneficiary by limiting any allowance or deduction to the extent of
the income received by that beneficiary from the trust.
This effectively sounded the death knell for the 'Lessor Trust Arrangement' as it
relies upon the allowances being set-off against other income accruing to the
financial institution concerned.
The position is that financial institutions had until the end of 1998 to continue the
'Lessor Trust Arrangement', whereafter they would have to find some other
arrangement that would be able to satisfy the needs of those clients whose
requirements were previously met by the 'Lessor Trust Arrangement'.
En commandite partnerships may provide the solution, but in order to do this they
would have to provide a vehicle whereby a separate persona (not necessarily legal)
could form a link between the financial institution and the client, which persona
could enter into agreements with both the financial institution and the client, and
which would provide a mechanism for separating the income from the capital. This
would then allow the financial institution to receive the benefit of the allowances
without having these allowances limited to the income received from the said
persona. It would also allow the client to fully deduct all payments made to the
persona for the use of the asset and at the end of the period would allow the client
Page 23
to receive ownership of the assets financed without incurring a recoupment or any
other tax disadvantage.
The en commandite partnership provides many of the requirements of the
replacement vehicle sought. In order to determine how effective it might be some
of the more pertinent aspects need to be considered.
Can the Partnership Enter into Contracts with its own Partners
In order to answer this question it is important to consider the two theories
regarding the legal nature of partnerships.
• The first theory is that the partnership is a legal entity distinct and separate from
its members - this has been called the 'entity' or 'mercantile' theory, and
• the second theory is that the partnership is merely a collection of individuals -
known as the 'aggregate' theory.
The Entity Theory
The 'entity' theory considers that the partnership is a separate body to the partners
of which it is composed, much like the concept of a company. It has been adopted
in many civil law jurisdictions, notably France, Belgium, Spain, Scotland, Louisiana
and many Latin American countries. In Scotland, for example, however, although
the separate entity of the partnership is explicit it is still treated differently to the
juristic persona of an incorporated association. 18
18
See Henning and Delport supra in footnote 9 to para 386.
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The Aggregate Theory
English law does not recognise the partnership as an entity separate and distinct
from the members comprising it, and it is this 'aggregate' theory that is generally
followed in common law jurisdictions (of which South Africa is one). The theory is
• that the partnership is treated merely as an aggregate or collection of
individuals composing it,
• that the partners own the assets forming the partnership assets,
• that the rights and obligations of the partnership are their own rights and
obligations,
• and that any change of partners destroys the identity of the partnership.
A partner can be the debtor or creditor of the other partners but not of the
partnership itself according to a strict interpretation of the 'aggregate' theory, and he
also cannot be employed by the partnership nor can he contract with the
partnership.
Notwithstanding the strict statement of each of the above theories there are many
instances where the distinction in practice between the two theories has been
blurred and aspects of the one theory are incorporated in the other.
In South African law the aggregate theory is not strictly pursued, thus it has been
held in Silbert & Co v Evans & C019
• that a distinction be made between the partnership creditors and the creditors of
the individual partners,
• that partnership creditors should have preference over partnership assets, and
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• that creditors of an individual partner could not lay claim to that share of the
partnership assets accruing to the debtor to the prejudice of partnership
creditors.
Furthermore Voet in his treatise on the law of partnership considered that a partner
could be convicted of theft of partnership property, thus implying that the property is
owned by some 'entity' separate from the partners themselves. 20
The Insolvency Acf1 changes the common law approach to partnerships in that it
retains the partnership estate as a separate estate from the estates of the individual
partners and precludes partnership creditors from preferring their claims against the
individual estates. Thus partnership creditors have to look initially to the
partnership assets only and the trustee of the partnership can then only look to the
residue of the partners non-partnership assets once these have been used to settle
creditors of his private estate. Separate accounts have to be drawn in respect of
each of these estates. It has thus been held that upon insolvency the partnership
asset must be treated 'as a separate entity as soon and as long as its liabilities
exceed the value of its assets,.22
In Civil Practice and Procedure the partnership is also treated as a separate entity,
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For example,
• a partnership creditor is obliged to sue all the partners together for payment of a
partnership debt,23
• judgment must be taken against the partnership and not the individuals
themselves,
• the partnership assets must be attached first and only upon them being
exhausted may the assets of the individual partners be attached,24
• and a partnership may sue and be sued in its own name. 25
In South Africa there has thus not been a strict compliance with the aggregate
theory and one sees that the above exceptions or quasi-exceptions have led Hahlo
and Kahn to describe the partnership as being26
'without substance, a kind of juristic ghost which comes nearest to materialising in
the statutory provision for the separation of partnership estates'.
Although it is generally accepted that a person cannot contract with himself and that
upon a strict application of the 'aggregate' theory it would not be possible for a
partner to contract with the partnership, because of the peculiar nature of the South
African partnership the following was held in Executors of Paterson v Webster,
Steel & Co 27 that:
'The real question ... [is] whether the firm should be looked upon as a body distinct
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look merely to the partners comprising the firm. There can be no doubt that, as a
general principle, the Court can only recognise the members of which the firm
consists.... [I] do not wish to be understood as laying down that a contract may not
be made with a firm as a firm if this be clearly the intention of the parties.'
There is further evidence to support this submission - in the case of Strydom v
Protea Eiendomsagente Nestadt J, in considering whether two partnerships having
common members could sue each other based on a contract purportedly entered
into between them, stated that2s
'The solution of this problem in our law depends largely on whether our Courts
would regard a partnership as having a persona legis for this purpose, and it is
submitted that according to our law it has.... It is clear that for certain purposes a
partnership is considered to possess a persona legis, eg in cases of compensation
in insolvency etc.'
In Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Lombard it was held that a partner could bind himself
as surety in solidum for debts of the partnership to creditors. Botha J stated thaf9
'this ... was plainly the object sought to be achieved by means of the documents in
question ... I can see no reason why the documents should not be valid and
operative as such, even if it is to be assumed that they do not qualify as suretyships
stricto sensu, a matter on which I need not express any firm opinion.'
In Shingadia Bros v Shingadia the following was stated in this regard: 30
'The issue in this appeal does not relate to the validity of a lease by a partnership to
a partner. That was assumed to be valid in the High Court, and there is
considerable authority for that view. In England in Doe d. Colnaghi v. Bluck ... there
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similar case is set out in a note 173 .... See also Pocock v Carter ... In Whitaker v
Whitaker & Rowe ... Pittman J said:
liThe contract sued on, a lease by one partner to a partnership firm, appears to
embody a somewhat anomalous relationship, but its validity according to our law is
admitted ... In England it is clear ... that such a contract is regarded as valid, and
the admission just mentioned induces us in the absence of authority to the contrary
to accept the law as being to the same effect in South Africa." ,
The above authorities confirm then that if the partners have the intention to enter
into a contract with the partnership then the courts will recognise the contract. The
conclusion is thus that a partner can contract with the partnership.
Property in Partnership
As was discussed above, South African legislation grants partnerships recognition
of the separate nature of the partnership estate, especially as regards the
Insolvency Act. Unfortunately the courts have not yet had the opportunity to clarify
many of the other aspects of partnership property that arise, and until the courts
can apply their judicial mind to these other aspects, a determination of the approach
that would be considered correct by the courts must be based upon existing judicial
precedent.
The establishment of a partnership fund is not one of the essentialia for the
constituting of a partnership and thus partnership assets do not need to be jointly
owned by the partners. It is therefore quite possible for a particular asset to be
treated by the partners inter se as a partnership asset although from a property law
point of view it is held in the name of only one of the partners (this is particularly so
in the en commandite partnership).
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Property vests in the partnership as a fulfilment of the intention of the partners -
thus if the partners intend property to vest in the partnership then it shall be
considered to be a partnership asset. This is all the greater reason to reduce the
partnership agreement to writing, especially in en commandite partnerships.
Furthermore, it is beneficial to the commanditarian partner in that there is no need
to register a transfer of the asset into the name of the client at the end of the
financing period, as the asset is already registered in his name.
Shares in Partnership
A partner's share in a partnership is two-fold.
• He first has a share to his proportionate interest in the partnership property
remaining after realisation and settlement of partnership creditors, and
• secondly he has a right to his proportionate share of the profits of the
partnership that are earned from time to time.
The first right can be equated to equity capital in a company, or the rights to capital
in a trust.
The second can be equated to the income proceeds emanating from the equity
capital or the rights to the income from the trust.
A partner cannot look upon any partnership assets as his own until the assets have
been realised and the extent of his share has been determined and this would
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normally only take place upon the termination of a partnership. Partners generally
agree on interim sharing of profits at year-end though.
Can a Partner's Share be Ceded
For the purposes of financial structuring, it is important that at all times the partner
has an interest that can be valued and if necessary realised. It is important in
assessing the creditworthiness of a partner that his interest in the partnership can
be ceded to the financial institution or realised.
It is accepted law that the right to receive the profit sharing ratio upon dissolution,
as with most other rights, is capable of being ceded to another party. This asset
forms part of the partner's private estate and can be attached and sold in execution
to satisfy the claims of a partner's private creditors. 31
It is important to be aware that although a partner is entitled to cede or alienate his
interest in the business, a cession or alienation is not sufficient to make the
cessionary or purchaser a partner in the partnership. This principle is embodied in
the legal maxim socii mei socius, meus socius non est, which may be translated as
'the partner of my partner is not my partner'.
Thus a party may only become a partner with the consent of all the remaining
partners.
31
Sacks v CIR 1946 AD 31 at 43.
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The tax structuring opportunity that this provides is that if one were to secure the
irrevocable consent by the partners to the joining of a proposed partner to the
partnership in advance of the deal being concluded then it is conceivable that one
could enter into a forward sale of the entitlement. This could be expanded so as to
allow the partners to irrevocably agree to the admission of one of a class or order of
people as partner (for example, a financial institution). This would give the
partnership the option of agreeing up-front that in a set number of years, or upon
the happening of an event, the remaining partners would agree to the substitution of
one partner for another, provided that the proposed new partner met the criteria
agreed upon. As the criteria would be agreed in advance and would be irrevocable
there would be nothing to prevent the first-mentioned partner from entering into a
forward sale of his interest in the partnership. In like manner there would be
nothing to stop the partner discounting his entitlement to benefits arising in terms of
the agreement at a later date. This may provide an opportunity for 'bare dominium'
arrangements to be put into place using partnerships as the vehicle.
Bare dominium structures rely on the rights of use and the rights of ownership being
split for a period in order that the person with the rights of use can enter into a
rental over the property, in the knowledge that the rights of use and ownership will
later be re-united - this is generally achieved by forward selling the rights of
ownership to the lessee's holding company or to another related company. The
benefit to the client is that he is able to deduct in full the rentals paid whilst
transferring the bare dominium to a company in which he has an interest at a
fraction of the cost of a normal transfer, the justification being that the property is
subject to the lease and as the lease proceeds do not accrue to the bare dominium
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holder, but rather to the lessor, the market price for the bare dominium is
consequently relatively low.
As the right to receive the proceeds on termination of the partnership can be ceded,
this can be incorporated into financial planning. In terms of the 'Lessor Trust
Arrangement', the parties would agree, upon entering into the arrangement, that
there would be a participation switch between the income beneficiary and some
other party (normally the capital beneficiary) at some time in the future, but normally
once all the tax allowances had been claimed by the income beneficiary.
There is thus the possibility that in a partnership the partners could agree to sell
their interest to another party and so re-create those rights, obligations and
advantages that were created in the Lessor Trust Arrangement.
Sharin9 of Profits and Losses
A distinction can be drawn between the concepts of capital rights (the rights upon
dissolution) and income rights (the rights to the profits generated from the
partnership from time to time) and whereas the potential for discounting or ceding
capital rights has been explored, the potential for the structuring of the income
rights needs to now be considered.
In the absence of agreement the partners would normally share the profits in
accordance with the contributions that they have made to the partnership, however,
the partners are at liberty to agree to whatever profit-sharing ratios they wish.
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Indeed the Act envisages that there may exist a different ratio in respect of losses
and profits respectively. Section 24H(5)(a) states in reference to partnership profits
and losses that:
'Where any income has in common been received by or accrued to the members of
any partnership, a portion (determined in accordance with any agreement between
such members as to the ratio in which the profits or losses of the partnership are to
be shared).'
This provision implies that a different ratio may be agreed between the partners as
to the splitting of profits and losses respectively. Meyerowitz agrees that the
legislation allows for the different ratios but states that this raises a further problem,
namely the determination of what ratio should be utilised to restrict the allowances.
He states the problem as the following:32
The reference to the profit or loss ratio raises a difficulty where the ratio of profit
sharing differs from the loss sharing ratio. Where this is the case, it may be that
neither the accruals nor the deductions can be determined until in terms of the
partnership agreement the profit or loss is determined. Where the ratios differ, it
also becomes questionable as to the ratio in which tax allowances which do not
affect profit or loss are to be apportioned. It would seem more appropriate to use
the loss ratio rather than the profit ratio on the ground that an allowance is
connected with expenditure (capital or revenue).'
32
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Can One Partner Agree to Bear All the Losses and the Other Partner Agree to
Receive All the Profits
If one partner were to bear all the losses and the other all the losses this would not
meet the requirement that the partnership should have as its object the sharing of
profits, however, this particular type of arrangement did exist in Roman Dutch Law
and was called the 'societas leoninas,.33 It was not considered a valid partnership.
There is debate as to whether the insertion of this type of clause, referred to as a
leonine clause, would have the effect of making the entire partnership invalid, or
whether that particular clause is merely void, thus leaving the partners to share
profits in terms of common law principles.34 Henning and Delport state that there is
authority for both these viewpoints but that the South African courts have not yet
had an opportunity to express their view in this regard.
There is a further view in certain legal jurisdictions that a clause of this nature, and
consequently the partnership agreement itself, is valid as a donation agreement,35
Can One Party Agree to Bear all the Loss
In the case of Blumberg and Sulski v Brown and Freitas Wessels JP had the
following to say in regard to whether one partner could agree to bear all the loss in
a partnership: 36
'It is quite true that parties may agree that one partner is entitled to share the profits,
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partner is to have no share at all in any loss, whatever the transaction may be, it is
not a partnership.'
In Dickinson and Brown v Fisher's Executors Maasdorp JA stated the following: 37
'One of the first points raised by counsel for the plaintiffs was that no valid
partnership existed, because neither Fisher nor Brown were liable under the
agreement to bear a share in the losses of the business. But the great weight of
authority in our law is to the effect that participation in losses is not essential to the
constitution of a valid partnership. I need only refer to the following passage in
Voet (17,2,8):
" But a community in profit and loss is of the very essence of a partnership, so much
so that there is no legal partnership where such community cannot exist."
'And further on he adds:
"And in fact the partners might legally agree that one should receive a share of the
profit and yet not be liable for any loss."
'In the last case the agreement would seem, at first sight, to induce a community in
the profits only and not in the loss, a thing contrary to the principles of partnership;
but this is not really so, for in the case in question the profits are understood to
include only what remains after every liability has been met; and he, therefore, who
according to the apparent meaning of the words, at first sight would seem to be
freed from the burden of bearing a share in the loss, yet because of this set-off of
liability against profit, is in point of fact, a sharer in the loss also.'
There seems to be some confusion in South African law as to what the correct
situation is, bearing in mind that the Dickinson and Brown case was an Appellate
Division case and was heard in 1916, and that Blumberg and Sulski was heard in
37 1916 AD 374 at 394.
Page 36
1920 in the Transvaal Provincial Division (which was bound by decisions in the
Appellate Division).
The best way to summarise the situation in South African law is to say that the
sharing of losses is a requisite of a valid partnership agreement, but that the
reference to losses should be taken as a reference to a sharing of gross losses,
and not net losses of the partnership. The sharing of the profits and losses
therefore implies that a partner must at all events share in the losses 'so far, at
least, as they constitute a charge upon, and diminution or deduction from the
profits' .38
It has furthermore been held that as long as it is clear that each partner receives a
share of the profits, it does not matter that the formula that is used for the
determination of the respective shares is complex or unusual. In Dickinson and
Brown v Fisher's Executors39 a partner's share in the profits was fixed on the basis
of a certain percentage on his capital contribution to the partnership and this was
considered to be sharing in the profits and not repayment of a loan.
The above reference gives authority for the view that the profit sharing ratio can be
complex provided, however, that all partners receive a profit. If this is indeed the
case then nothing should preclude the partners from agreeing to change the
partnership profit sharing ratio from time to time - indeed it is accepted that the
partners may decide on a split at the end of each year regarding the profits of that
year, and this decision would no doubt take place having regard to various factors
38
39
Henning and Delport supra in para 371.
Ibid.
Page 37
pertaining at that time. If this principle is accepted then its application can be
extended to agreement on different profit sharing ratios prior to and upon entering
into the partnership.
Profit Motive
It is one of Pothier's requirements for a valid partnership that the partnership
makes profits and divides them amongst the partners.40 A partnership is therefor
not established where the aim is merely the acquisition and not the ultimate sharing
of profits. The making of profits must be the immediate and main aim of the
partnership and cannot be an incidental possibility of the venture.41 Although the
main aim of the partnership must be the making of profits, it is not a requirement
that it actually make a profit, just as long as the partnership was capable of making
a profit and this was the intention. A speculative venture can therefore be a
partnership.42
The question that really needs to be addressed is whether this profit motive need
be a profit motive in the partnership itself, or is it sufficient that the partner derives a
benefit elsewhere that he would otherwise not have got had he not entered into the
partnership.
South African courts have never directly decided the question whether gain as
opposed to profits can be the aim of the partnership and, if so, what type of gain
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require lucrum or quaestus43 to be the aim of the partnership.44 The concepts are
wide enough to include both profits and other gains and it can thus be accepted that
the profit motive referred to by Pothier in his description of the partnership is
capable of being interpreted in the wider sense.45
In Isaacs v Isaacs 46 it was held that the object of a partnership being 'to provide for
the livelihood and comfort of the parties, and that of their children, including the
proper education and upbringing of the latter' was equivalent to the making of a
profit. and was thus sufficient for partnership purposes.
In England, the Partnership Act of 1890 does not contain a definition of the concept
of profit although English law does require that profit be the motive for a properly
constituted partnership. As the English law requirements are similar to South
African law it is beneficial to consider how the English courts of law have
approached the profit requirement. Although not decisive in South African law,
these decisions do have persuasive value. It is important in the determination of the
ability to use partnerships as tax structuring tools to ascertain what South African
courts would consider to be a proper profit motive.
In the case of Newstead (Inspector of Taxes) v Frost47 there is authority for the
proposition that a partnership entered into for a fiscal motive, namely, tax
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actor David Frost had set up a partnership with an off-shore company based in the
Bahamas and the partnership had then conducted the business of entertaining with
an agreement that any profits would be split in the ratio 95/5 in favour of the
taxpayer and the off-shore company respectively. Most of the activities forming part
of the partnership business were conducted outside of Britain and no part of the
taxpayer's share of the profits were remitted to Britain. The Crown sought to
challenge the validity of the partnership on two main bases,
• the first being that the company could not enter into partnership with the
taxpayer as it could not do the same activity (namely entertaining) as the
taxpayer, and
• secondly, that the sole motive for entering into the partnership was to derive a
fiscal advantage, namely, avoidance of tax, which was not a profit motive as
was required in terms of their Partnership Act.
Buckley LJ held the following: 48
'It is in my judgment clear from s 1 of the 1890 Act that the statutory definition of
'partnership' requires that the parties shall carry on business (a) in common and
(b) with a view of profit. It has been submitted that the adverbial phrases "in
common with" and "with a view of profit" both qualify the words "carry on business",
and this would seem to me to be correct. Nevertheless, counsel for the Crown
submits that the common intention here was not to make a profit but to avoid tax.
'For my part, it seems clear that the activities on which the company and the
taxpayer were embarking were intended to be profitable. The company and the
taxpayer were to divide the profits of these activities in specific proportions. The
fact that by setting up the partnership the parties hoped to achieve a measure of tax
avoidance by the taxpayer does not import that the partnership business was not to
48 At 137-138.
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be conducted with a view of profit. It was to be conducted with a view of profit,
which it was hoped would avoid tax.
'... This scheme is admittedly a scheme devised to avoid tax; but that in itself, in
my judgment, does not in any way vitiate the scheme, provided they were genuine
transactions which were entered into.'
Roskill LJ agreed with the judgment of Buckley LJ and quoted the following
passage from the case of Lupton (Inspector of Taxes) v FA & AB Ltd, which extract
had been expressly approved in the House of Lords: 49
'If on analysis it is found that the greater part of the transaction consists of elements
for which there is some trading purpose or explanation (whether ordinary or
extraordinary), then the presence of what I may call "fiscal element", inserted solely
or mainly for the purpose of producing a fiscal benefit, may not suffice to deprive the
transaction of its trading status. The question is whether, viewed as a whole, the
transaction is one which can fairly be regarded as a trading transaction. If it is then
it will not be denatured merely because it was entered into with motives of reaping a
fiscal advantage. Neither fiscal elements nor fiscal motives will prevent what in
substance is a trading transaction from ranking as such. On the other hand, if the
greater part of the transaction is explicable only on fiscal grounds, the mere
presence of elements of trading will not suffice to translate the transaction into the
realms of trading. In particular, if what is erected is predominantly an artificial
structure, remote from trading and fashioned so as to secure a tax advantage, the
mere presence in that structure of certain elements which by themselves could fairly
be described as trading will not cast the cloak of trade over the whole structure.'
According to Dutch law a pecuniary profit motive is not strictly required and the
gaining of another material advantage would suffice, the example given in Henning
and Delport being a joint exercise for the purpose of saving costs. In Ally v Dinath50
it was held that in determining whether a universal partnership between a common
49
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law man and wife had been brought into existence, the objective of 'the
accumulation of an appreciating joint estate' was considered a sufficient profit
motive for the establishment of the partnership. Eloff J stated the following:51
'What is required is not a pure pecuniary profit motive; the achievement of another
material gain, such as a joint exercise for the purpose of saving costs, will suffice.
De Groot 3.12.1 requires no more than that the aim should be "gemene baat te
trekken". And in Isaac's case supra at 956 an object "to provide for the livelihood
and comfort of the parties, and their children, including the proper education and
upbringing of the latter" was held to be equivalent to making a profit and thus
sufficient for partnership purposes. In the present case the objective of the
accumulation of an appreciating joint estate is alleged, and, at least for pleading
purposes, that is in my estimation sufficient.'
The authorities do not seem to draw a distinction between commercial partnerships
and other partnerships and it would seem that there is no difference in the
requirements between a partnership formed for commercial reasons and one
formed as a universal partnership. Accordingly, the cases referred to above that
deal with universal partnerships are relevant with respect to partnerships formed for
commercial purposes.
To summarise the law as it stands is to state that there is a general move towards a
widening of the scope of the profit motive, but that this has not yet been clearly
expounded. If it were to be argued that the gaining of a fiscal advantage, or a
benefit otherwise not attainable other than through the partnership, is the profit
motive of the partnership, then it would seem that the profit requirement would have
been met. This trend has been seen in England and the Netherlands and should
51 At 455B-C.
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provide enough authority for the view that a gain other than an actual profit should
suffice to meet the profit motive requirement.
In any event, in order to make certain that there is no doubt as to the profit criterion
it is advised that a partnership be entered into where there is a pecuniary profit
motive.
If the wider interpretation of 'profit motive' is accepted then any partnership that a
financial institution were to enter into with a client would by its very nature meet the
profit motive criterion. The simple fact is that parties contracting at arm's length to
each other would not enter into a partnership in the first place unless they stood to
gain something from it. Generally this gain would be that a client would derive a
fiscal advantage as a result of a reduced funding rate and the financial institution
would lend money to or via the partnership that it otherwise would not have lent.
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Chapter 4
Specific Legislation Dealing with En Commandite
Partnerships
Introduction
A partnership is not defined in the Income Tax Act and for normal tax purposes it is
not regarded as a taxpaying entity. There are, however, certain sections of the Act
that deal with partnerships.
Section 66(15) requires that a partnership make a joint return. Each partner is
separately and individually liable but the Commissioner usually accepts a copy of
the partnership's financial statements from anyone of the partners.52
Section 77(7) states that the partners are liable for income tax in their individual
capacities. The Commissioner, therefore, apportions the taxable income of the
partnership amongst the partners in their profit sharing ratio, and each partner is
then taxed on his share of the profits. The partnership itself is not liable for the
payment of the tax.
Section 24H is aimed at regulating the tax treatment of limited partners and
clarifying the question of accruals to individual partners in general.
52
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Section 24H(5) was inserted in order to override a legal principle that arose in the
case of Sacks v CIR 53 where it was held that a partner's share of the profits only
accrued to him when the profits were brought to account. Although this was
normally at the end of the partnership's financial year, the principle was abused and
led certain partnerships to delay finalisation of their accounts until, in some cases,
termination of that partnership.
The facts of the Sacks case were that the partners had agreed a partnership profit
sharing ratio, which, prior to the financial year-end of the partnership they amended
so as to agree a fixed amount with the one partner, Sacks, which then later turned
out to be less than the amount to which he would otherwise have become entitled.
The Commissioner contended that the amount calculated in terms of the profit ratio
had already accrued to Sacks and that he should be taxed on the greater amount.
The Appellate Division held that only the lesser amount had accrued to Sacks.
The ratio of this case had the effect of entrenching the principle that partners only
became entitled to the profits and liable for the debts of the partnership upon
finalisation of the accounts.
It was thus considered necessary to amend the legislation so as to ensure that
amounts accrued to the partners at the same time as they accrued to the
partnership.
Section 24H(5) legislates that income accruing to the partnership is deemed to
accrue to the partners in their profit sharing ratios on the same date, and that
53
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expenses and allowances relating to these amounts are deemed to be that of the
individual partners.
Section 24H states the following:
'(1) For the purposes of this section, "limited partner" means any
member of a partnership en commandite, an anonymous partnership or any similar
partnership, if such member's liability towards a creditor of the partnership is limited
to the amount which he has contributed or undertaken to contribute to the
partnership or is in any other way limited.
'(2) Where any trade or business is carried on in partnership, each
member of such partnership shall, notwithstanding the fact that he may be a limited
partner, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be carrying on such trade or
business.
'(3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act contained, the
amount of any allowance or deduction which may be granted to any taxpayer under
any provision of this Act other than section 11 bis in respect of or in connection with
any trade or business carried on by him in a partnership in relation to which he is a
limited partner shall not in the aggregate exceed the sum of-
(a) the amount, whether it consists of the taxpayer's contribution to the
partnership or of any other amount, for which the taxpayer is or may
be held liable to any creditor of the partnership; and
(b) any income received by or accrued to the taxpayer from such trade
or business.
'(4) Any allowance or deduction which has been disallowed under the
provisions of subsection (3) shall be carried forward and be deemed to be an
allowance or deduction to which the taxpayer is entitled in the succeeding year of
assessment.
'(5) (a) Where any income has in common been received by or accrued to
the members of any partnership, a portion (determined in accordance with any
agreement between such members as to the ratio in which the profits or losses of
the partnership are to be shared) of such income shall, notwithstanding anything to
the contrary contained in any law or the relevant agreement of partnership, be
deemed to have been received by or to have accrued to each such member
individually on the date upon which such income was received by or accrued to
them in common.
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'(b) Where a portion of any income is under the provisions of
paragraph (a) deemed to have been received by or to have accrued to a taxpayer, a
portion (determined as aforesaid) of any deduction or allowance which may be
granted under the provisions of this Act in the determination of the taxable income
derived from such income shall be granted in the determination of the taxpayer's
taxable income so derived.'
The main purpose of s 24H is to restrict the allowance or deduction which a limited
partner may claim to the amount for which he is or may be held liable to creditors,
plus any income received by him from the partnership. Any allowance or deduction
that cannot be claimed because of the restriction may be carried forward to the
following year. There are a number of inconsistencies regarding the above
legislation that are discussed in an article entitled '1988 Amendments to the
Taxation of Partnerships,.54
The first is that s 24H(1) defines a limited partner as meaning a member of a
partnership en commandite, an anonymous partnership, if that member's liability
towards a creditor of the partnership is limited to the amount he has contributed or
undertaken to contribute to the partnership. This definition is not in keeping with the
common law definitions of these two partnerships as in common law an anonymous
partner in an anonymous partnership does not have limited liability, but rather is
liable to the extent of the profit sharing ratio that he has entered into with the other
partner. If his liability were limited then it would be an en commandite partnership,
thus it is contended that, in fact, this legislation only deals with en commandite
partnerships and not anonymous partnerships.
54 Editorial '1988 Amendments to the Taxation of Partnerships' (1988) October The
Taxpayer 183.
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The second inconsistency is that the definition in s 24H(1) states 'if such member's
liability towards a creditor is limited' whereas in the common law a commanditarian
partner's liability is solely to the disclosed partners and not to the creditor directly.
This statement runs counter to the very purpose of the en commandite partnership
which is to hide the existence of the commanditarian partner from the creditor thus
ensuring that at no time could the undisclosed partner ever become liable to the
creditor directly.
The possibility is thus raised that a taxpayer might seek to exclude the provisions of
the section from applying to him on the basis that his liability as commanditarian
partner is solely to the disclosed partners thus arguing that he does not fall under
the definition and that consequently the provisions of s 24H should not apply to him.
This is a risky argument as the intention of the legislation is quite clear. The article
states that it might have been preferable for the definition in the section to read: 'if
such member's liability in respect of a creditor or creditors is limited'. This it is
agreed would express the intention more clearly. With the trend in interpretation of
taxing statutes towards interpreting the meaning of the legislation as opposed to the
the strict letter of the law it is doubted that a defence of this nature would have
much chance of success.
How should section 24H(3) be construed
It needs to be considered whether the deductions and allowances should be
determined on an annual or cumulative basis.
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The 'annual basis' would be to determine the income and deductions for each year
in isolation from the previous year save for the fact that s 24H(5) allows for any
disallowed amount to be carried forward to the next year as a deduction to which
that taxpayer is then entitled in that following year.
The 'cumulative basis' is to determine income and deductions allowed by
comparing the aggregate allowances and deductions over all the relevant years of
assessment, including the current year, taking into account the taxpayer's
contributory liability and the income derived by him from the trade or business over
the relevant years.
Meyerowifz55 is of the opinion that as there is no reference in the section to the
current year of assessment, either in regard to the aggregate allowances and
deductions, or in regard to the income received by or accrued to the taxpayer, that
this is indicative of the intention being to interpret the section using the cumulative
basis.
Section 24H(3) refers to the allowances and deductions being limited to the
aggregate of the capital contribution and the amount of the income received,
however, the word 'income' is used which is defined in the Act as 'the amount
remaining of the gross income of any person for any year or period of assessment
after deducting therefrom any amounts exempt from normal tax under Part I of
Chapter 11'. Meyerowifz argues the following:56
55
56
Meyerowitz on Income Tax, supra in §§16.81.
Meyerowitz on Income Tax, supra at §§16.82.
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'It is in our view possible to argue with a good deal of merit, having regar~ to the
intention to permit the taxpayer to deduct allowances and deductions to the extent
of his liability for the debts of the partnership, that in the context of s 24H(3)
"income" should be given a wider meaning to include all gross revenue of the
partnership from all sources and not its definition meaning, that is gross income less
so much thereof as is exempt from tax.'
This would be the approach that the partnerships should take in order to ensure
that the availability of the allowances and deductions in the hands of the
commanditarian partner are maximised.
The importance of this provision is that if the intention is to be the commanditarian
partner and to claim tax allowances and deductions, then it is important that the
partner's contribution plus income earned from the partnership exceeds the
allowances sought to be claimed.
Revenue Practice
In terms of s 66(13)ter the Commissioner has a discretion to allow for income
received up until a different date to be included in the year of assessment of the
taxpayer. Thus it is the practice of the Commissioner to allow, in bona fide cases,
where the partnership year-end is different to that of one of the partners, to accept
returns of income to that date. Where companies or close corporations are
involved then they may have different financial year-ends and, in the event of that
happening, the Commissioner will accept partnership accounts drawn to one date
for the purposes of all the partners.57
57 Meyerowitz supra in §§16.75.
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Section 24H(2) is a deeming provision which applies to all partners in a partnership
which is carrying on a trade and deems them all to be carrying on a trade.
Section 23(g) of the Act requires that deductions may only be claimed against
income to the extent that the deductions have been expended or laid out for the
purpose of trade. The deeming provision thus removes the necessity for a partner
to prove that it has met the trade requirement. This has benefited the
commanditarian taxpayer in that prior to this legislation being enacted, he was
required to prove that he was carrying on the trade of the partnership before he




An advantage that a partnership offers to the financial institution that is looking to
replace the 'Lessor Trust Arrangement' is that an asset being financed in a
partnership need not be transferred out of the partnership at the end of the
financing period and, consequently, a recoupment liability can be avoided.
The problem that may arise is where the financial institution wishes to terminate its
involvement with the partnership entirely once the financing of the transaction is
complete. This termination may be effected in one of two ways:
• The partnership might sell the asset to a third party (or even the client) and then
split the proceeds; or
• it may sell its interest in the partnership to a third party who then takes over the
position of the financial institution in the partnership, which partnership, for all
intents and purposes, continues to lease the asset as if there had been no
change in partners.
If the first option is followed then there will be a termination of the partnership and if
a transfer to a third party purchaser is concluded then there should be a
recoupment in the hands of the partnership, as there is now a sale of the asset and
a consequent transfer.
If, however, this sale were done at the tax value of the asset then there would be no
recoupment.
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If the second option is followed then the question needs to be addressed as to
whether a recoupment will arise, or whether a deemed recoupment will arise.
Sections 8(4)(a) and (k) deal with recoupments and deemed recoupments and state
the following:
'There shall be included in the taxpayer's income all amounts allowed to be
deducted or set off under the provisions of sections 11 to 20, inclusive, section 240,
section 24F, section 24G and section 27 (2) (b) and (d) of this Act, except
section 11 (k), (p) and (q)/ section 11 quin, section 12 (2) or section 12 (2) as applied
by section 12 (3), section 12A (3), section 13 (5), or section 13 (5) as applied by
section 13 (8), or section 13bis (7), or section 15 (a), or section 15A, or under the
corresponding provisions of any previous Income Tax Act, whether in the current or
any previous year of assessment which have been recovered or recouped during
the current year of assessment.'
'For the purposes of paragraph (a), where during any year of assessment any
person has donated or distributed by way of a dividend, any asset in respect of
which a deduction or an allowance has been granted to such person in terms of any
of the provisions referred to in that paragraph, such person shall be deemed to have
recovered or recouped an amount equal to the market value of such asset as at the
date of such donation or distribution.'
Silke 58 expresses the view that a recoupment may occur upon the transfer of a
partner's interest, as there is a disposal of the partnership assets, to the extent of
the interest that changes hands. However, Silke does say that if the amount that is
due for the disposal of the asset is not due and payable but represents a capital
58
Divaris, C and Kahn, E: Silke on South African Income Tax, Eleventh Memorial Edition, Juta
in §§11.5.
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contribution, there may be no recoupment.
In Desai and others v Desai and another9 and Smith v Weston60 it was held that no
sale of partnership assets occurs where an existing partnership dissolves and a
new partnership is formed. These cases effectively reversed the decision in
Whiteaways Estate and others v CIFt1 which had held that where a partnership
held immovable property, the partners should become liable for transfer duty each
time that the ratio of the interest held in the partnership by the partners changed or
that a new partner was admitted or an existing partner left the partnership.
This ratio was not followed and in the Desai case Meskin AJ referred to the Smith v
Weston case and stated that the decision in that case that the transfer of a
partnership constituted a transfer of a ius in personam and not a ius in rem and so
consequently could not be considered a transfer of immovable property, was
correctly decided.62 He went on further to state, in regard to a previous decision in
Berry v Mann 63 that:64
'[w]ith respect, I consider that there must be considerable doubt as to whether this
case was correctly decided. Insofar as it decides that a partner's interest in a
partnership, that is the bundle of rights of action which the existence of such interest
predicates, represents immovable property or an interest in immovable property,
within the meaning of legislation such as s 1 of Natal Law 12 of 1884, merely
because one of the partnership's assets is an immovable property, then I regret I







1993 (3) SA 874 (N) at 880 A - 881C.
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In the light of the above it seems that Silke's view may not be correct and that in
fact, even if the commanditarian partner were to sell his interest he would not
become liable for the recoupment.
In any event, even if Silke's view were correct then the recoupment would only be in
respect of that portion of the allowances as was allowed to the commanditarian
partner (that is 99% or 1%).
Obviously, if the financial institution is concerned about the risk of incurring a
recoupment it can limit its risk by agreeing in the partnership agreement that there
be a split between the rights to income from the assets and the rights to the capital
of the asset. If the financial institution only receives a 1% interest in the asset itself
upon dissolution (that is the capital) this would ensure that any recoupment would
be limited to the 1% value of the asset. The risk can thus be limited.
A Liability under s 8(5)(a)
Section 8(5)(a) reads as follows:
'Any amount which has been paid, whether in the form of rent or otherwise, by any
person for the right of use or occupation of any movable or immovable property and
has been allowed as a deduction in the determination of such person's taxable
income, and which or the equivalent of which is upon the subsequent acquisition of
such property by that or any other person applied in reduction or towards settlement
of the purchase price of such property, shall be included in the income of the person
by whom the property is acquired as aforesaid for the year of assessment in which
such person exercises the option or concludes the agreement, as the case may be,
in consequence of which the property is acquired by him: Provided that the
provisions of this subsection shall not apply in any case where, in consequence of
the acquisition of such property, the person who has acquired the property or any
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other person has derived a taxable benefit the cash equivalent of which has been
included in his gross income in terms of the provisions of paragraph (i) of the
definition of "gross income" in section 1.'
This section provides that where an amount has been paid in the form of rent by
any person for the right of use or occupation of movable property, and that amount
has been allowed as a deduction in the determination of that person's taxable
income, and which is upon the subsequent acquisition of that property by that or
any other person applied in reduction or towards settlement of the purchase price of
that property, that amount shall be included in the income of the person by whom
the property is acquired.
The question to be considered is whether the acquisition of the commanditarian's
interest in the partnership can be equated with the acquisition of a percentage of
the relevant partnership assets and whether the rental paid by the lessee has been
applied in reduction or towards settlement of the purchase price of the said
property. The important concept in this provision is that the payment of the rental
must be applied in reduction or towards settlement of the purchase price of the
property.
In the proposal being considered there is no link between the payment of the rental
and the purchase price of the interest held by the commanditarian partner and thus
there should not be a recoupment in the hands of the disclosed partner.
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Chapter 6
Business Rationale For Using the En Commandite
Partnership
The en commandite partnership is an ideal vehicle for a financial institution to
provide financing to the client. As the commanditarian partner is not disclosed it
means that the financial institution is not able to be marketed by the disclosed
partner (the client) as its partner in business - this ensures that a financial
institution's reputation is not able to be harmed by the actions of the disclosed
partner. The anonymity provided by the en commandite partnership also ensures
that the financial institution's business is not harmed if it were seen to be providing
finance to a competitor of a potential client. Furthermore the financial institution's
liability is limited to that amount that it contributes to the partnership, and thus unlike
normal partnerships, the financial institution is able to limit its risk.
The financial institution might also require that, as a condition of it entering into the
partnership, that it receive a right of first refusal in respect of all future funding
requirements of the client and thus it might establish a monopoly on future funding
to that client.
Furthermore, where it remains in partnership once the funding period has elapsed,
it continues to receive a profit share (albeit perhaps only 10/0) which it otherwise
would not have received at all.
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From the viewpoint of the disclosed partner it is an ideal relationship as it lifts the
relationship of lender and borrower to that of business partner which has numerous
benefits, which might include, amongst others,
• better rates,
• advice on business dealings, and
• the use of bank facilities (for example, credit checking etcetera).
It is to be stressed that there is an essentially different relationship between
business partners and borrowers and lenders. For example, business meetings to
discuss strategy etcetera will lead to greater understanding between the parties and
will develop a relationship that is more beneficial than that merely of borrower and
lender.
If a client finds itself in financial difficulty it would be able more readily to find a
sympathetic ear of a partner than someone with whom it only shares a borrower
and lender relationship.




• discounts on funding etcetera,
at the time of going into the partnership, and not thereafter as and when funding
was required. This gives the client a better negotiating position. Not only is the
client able to negotiate good facilities from the commanditarian partner, if it
becomes unhappy with the rates, service etcetera it is still able to source funding
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elsewhere without having to disclose the existence of the commanditarian partner.
This is positive for the client who is now able to rely on one financial institution to
provide his funding requirements at pre-agreed rates etcetera according to an
established modus operandi, but who has not extinguished the possibility of
receiving funding elsewhere, as the commanditarian partner remains undisclosed.
Basic Structure to be Formed
The partners agree that the financial institution will provide the financing for the
acquisition of the assets and that in return it shall be entitled to a 99% portion of the
profits arising out of the partnership. It can be agreed that the financial institution
will only receive this portion for the first four years (as it can be accepted that the
financial institution is in the business to make money from financing and that once it
receives the return that it wishes to receive it is prepared to reduce its profit sharing
portion).
Thereafter the financial institution reduces its portion to 1%.
This would be normal business practice for a financial institution because it would
effectively have no further loan exposure to the partnership (it having received its
'capital' with a return commensurate with that which it would have received had it
loaned the money· to the partnership in a conventional manner) and its risk
exposure would be limited to the total contribution that it had already made to the
partnership.
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On the other hand, there does remain a profit motive as it will continue to receive
1% of the profits of the partnership for as long as the partnership continues to exist.
Furthermore, the client receives the benefit of not having to pay any recoupments in
respect of the asset as there is no transfer of the asset out of the hands of the
partnership - the partnership retains ownership of the asset.
Loan vs Contribution
The following was stated in LAWSA:65
'It is clear that a partnership cannot be formed unless a party's contribution to the
enterprise is subject to the risks of the venture. Thus, where a party advances
capital to a business upon the basis that the full amount plus interest must be
returned to him at a later stage, whatever the fortunes of the business, the
arrangement is one of loan and not partnership.'
In order for the partnership to be used as a tax structuring tool the financial
institution must have risk in the venture.
In the proposed replacement structure to the 'Lessor Trust Arrangement', the
financial institution must be careful not to structure the arrangement as one of loan.
As long as there is an element of risk to the venture then the arrangement will be
considered one of partnership.
65
Henning and Delport, The Law of South Africa, Volume 19, 1984, Butterworths.
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A capital contribution is only repayable to the commanditarian partner once all
creditors have been settled - accordingly there is a risk to the commanditarian
partner.
The financial institution is faced with three avenues for structuring this deal,
• it can either inject funds into the partnership by way of capital contribution, or
• by loan, or
• by a combination of the two.
A capital contribution ensures that the arrangement is not considered one of loan,
and there must thus be at least a monetary contribution in order to ensure that this
requirement is met. The important choice that faces the financial institution is to
decide as to what ratio it wishes to make a contribution and a loan. A consideration
of the provisions of s 24H might aid in the determination of a suitable ratio.
Section 24H(3)(a) limits the deductions and allowances available to the
commanditarian partner to the amount that the partner is liable to pay towards the
liabilities plus any income he has received from the partnership. If it is assumed
that the funding requirement of a partnership is R100 then the following normal tax
calculations would be done for,
• in the first instance, that partnership that decides to use mainly loan funding,
and
• in the second instance, that partnership that decides to fund the requirement
entirely by way of contribution.
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Example I
Partnership relying upon loan funding. On-going capital contributions based on
capital allowance savings and interest expenses are not taken into account for
purposes of this calculation.
Assumptions
Commanditarian partner's contribution: RO,99.
Disclosed partner's contribution: RO,01.
Balance of loan funding: R99.
Income for each year: R1O.
Asset purchase price: R100.
Wear-and-tear capital allowance on asset: R 25 a year (four year write off in terms










Tax deduction disallowed and carried forward to year 2
Year 2
R14,11
Capital allowance (see above)
Add amount carried forward from year 1:
Limited to
99% of income for years 1 and 2:
Plus extent of contribution








Tax deduction disallowed and carried forward to year 3 R29,21
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Year 3
Capital allowance (see above) R25,OO
Add amount carried forward from year 2: R29,21 R54,21
Limited to
99% of income for years 1,2 and 3 R29,70
Plus extent of contribution: RO,99
R30,69
Less deduction allowed in years 1and 2 R20,79 R9,90
Tax deduction disallowed and carried forward to year 4: R44,31
Year 4
Capital allowance (see above) R25,OO
Add amount carried forward from year 3 R44,31 R69,31
Limited to
99% of income for years 1,2, 3 and 4 R39,60
Plus extent of contribution: RO,99
R40,59
Less deductions allowed in years 1,2 and 3
R30,69 R9,90
Tax deduction disallowed and carried forward to year 5: R59,41
Example 2
Partnership obtains funding from contributions by partners. On-going capital
contributions based on capital allowance savings and interest expenses are not
taken into account for purposes of this calculation.
Assumptions
Commanditarian partner's contribution: R99.
Disclosed partner's contribution: R1.
Income for each year: R10.
Asset purchase price: R100.
Wear-and-tear capital allowance on asset: R 25 a year (four year write off in terms





99% of income: R9
Plus extent of contribution R99 R108
Tax deduction disallowed and carried forward to year 2 R •.••
Year 2
Capital allowance R25
Add amount carried forward from year 1 -- R25-
Limited to
99% of income for years 1 and 2 R18
Plus extent of contribution R99
R117
Less deduction allowed in year 1 R25 R92
Tax deduction disallowed and carried forward to year 3 R -...
Year 3
Capital allowance R25
Add amount carried forward from year 2: R25
Limited to
99% of income for years 1,2 and 3 R27
Plus extent of contribution: R99
R126
Less deduction allowed
in years 1and 2: R50 R76
Tax deduction disallowed and carried forward to year 4 R ••••.•
Year 4
Capital allowance R25
Add amount carried forward from year 3: R25
Limited to:
99% of income for years 1,2, 3 and 4 R36
Plus extent of contribution R99
R135
Less deductions allowed in years 1,2 and 3 R75,OO R60
Tax deduction disallowed and carried forward to year 5 R·····
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Comparison of Results
As is evident from the above calculations, a partnership funded by way of loan
funding has deductions limited in the hands of the commanditarian partner,
whereas the capital-contribution funding route allows the deductions to be fully used
in the hands of the commanditarian partners.
In example 1 it is evident that the commanditarian partner was unable to make full
use of the deductions which he would otherwise have been able to make if he had
funded the partnership by contribution.
In example 2 the effect of the funding by contribution was to allow the
commanditarian partner a full deduction of all the allowances available.
It is quite simple to structure a partnership agreement so that the commanditarian
partner receives 990/0 of the income from the asset that is leased (for example) and
then to provide tax assumptions, or even a computer model, which calculates the
amount that is payable on the lease, thus effectively regulating the return that the
commanditarian partner is entitled to receive.
A legal draftsman should be able to provide that the financial institution incur the
same tax consequences as it would had it received conventional loan funding.
The only issue that might tempt a financial institution to avoid structuring an
agreement along these lines is if it were to be concerned that it might not be in the
same position as if it had granted a conventional loan and taken security for that
loan from the disclosed partner. It would seem, however, that this is a fear that can
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be circumvented. Being a 990/0 partner the financial institution would become
entitled to 99% of any claim against a defaulting debtor. In addition if it were fearful
of taking the risk on the disclosed partner then it could call for suretyships to be
provided for the performance of the disclosed partner to it. It could in turn require
security to be provided by the persons standing surety as it would normally require
for conventional loan funding.
Some financial institutions have looked at the possibility of using the
en commandite partnership as a tax-structuring alternative to the 'Lessor Trust
Arrangement'. Much of the research that has been undertaken has been
undertaken with a view to incorporating conventional lending into the partnership.
This research has exposed the consequences highlighted in example 1 above,
where the ring-fencing provisions of s 24H (3) (a) and (b) limit the deductions
allowed to the commanditarian partner so that the benefit to the client is reduced to
an extent that does not warrant the effort and expense required to achieve the
benefit.
The conclusion that has generally been reached by these institutions is that the only
way to receive the full benefits of the flow of capital allowances and deductions is to
enter into a normal partnership which is not subject to s 24H(3) (a) and (b) and thus
escape the ring-fencing constraints of these provisions. The problem that then
presents itself relates to neither tax nor financial modelling, but is a problem of risk.
Financial institutions do not wish to enter into unlimited partnerships as they may
then be exposed to an unlimited risk.
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In order to be competitive financial institutions need· to find alternatives to
conventional loan funding. One alternative is to provide financing by way of a
contribution to a partnership.
Alternatives at Finance Term End
As financial institutions wish to provide finance for a certain period only, during
which time they expect to realise a return and amortise the capital advanced, or in
the case of a contribution by the commanditarian partner, the capital contribution,
they must decide on what to do at the end of this financing period.
• Does the financial institution remain a partner even though the financing period
has fully elapsed, or
• does it extricate itself entirely from the partnership?
The issue, as commanditarian partner, is really to determine what the risk is to the
financial institution should it remain as a partner. Bearing in mind that a
commanditarian partner's risk is limited to the extent of the capital contribution, the
financial institution need only really reduce its contribution to an amount that it is
prepared to write-off. Thus at the end of the four year financing term the financial
institution could agree to a change in profit-sharing ratio's so that the disclosed
partner now receives 990/0 of the income and the financial institution 10/0.
To achieve this the disclosed partner could purchase the outstanding 98% interest
from the commanditarian partner. This would then entitle the disclosed partner to
receive 990/0 of the income and so too also bear 99% of the risk, whilst the financial
institution would only receive 1% of the income but correspondingly be liable to only
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a 1% risk factor. As the cost of the 1% risk would have been built into the return
required by the financial institution, the actual cost to the financial institution would
be nil. It would still continue to receive 1% of the income generated by the assets
financed in the partnership. This provides the financial institution with a profit
motive for entering into the partnership as opposed to providing conventional loan
funding (which would not entitle the financial institution to any more returns once
the funding period had elapsed).
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Chapter 7
Section 103 Attack on the Structure
Section 103(1) provides as follows:
, (1) Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that any transaction, operation or
scheme (whether entered into or carried out before or after the commencement of
this Act, and including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of
property)-
(a) has been entered into or carried out which has the effect of avoiding or
postponing liability for the payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed by this
Act or any previous Income Tax Act, or of reducing the amount thereof; and
(b) having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation
or scheme was entered into or carried out-
(i) was entered into or carried out-
(aa) in the case of a transaction, operation or scheme in the
context of business, in a manner which would not normally
be employed for bona fide business purposes, other than
the obtaining of a tax benefit; and
(bb) in the case of any other transaction, operation or scheme,
being a transaction, operation or scheme not falling within
the provisions of item (aa) , by means or in a manner which
would not normally be employed in the entering into or
carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the
nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;
or
(ii) has created rights or obligations which would not normally be
created between persons dealing at arm's length under a
transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction,
operation or scheme in question; and
(e) was entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the purposes of
obtaining a tax benefit,
the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax, duty or levy imposed by
this Act, and the amount thereof, as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not
been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the
case he deems appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance,
postponement or reduction.'
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Section 103 curtails the Duke of Westminstet6 principle, which is that there should
be no obligation to pay any tax that can validly be avoided by the structuring of
one's tax affairs.
The provisions of s 103 have been summarised in most, if not all, s 103 cases, in
particular SIR v Geustyn Forsyth & Joubert 67and CIR v Louvls where it was
confirmed that all the four requirements set out below must be present for the
Commissioner to invoke the section.
If the Commissioner is satisfied that the four requirements set out are present then
he may determine the liability for income tax as if the particular transaction,
operation or scheme had not been entered into or had been entered into in such a
manner that he has deemed fit for the prevention or diminution of the avoidance,
postponement or reduction of the liability for tax.
In order to invoke the section the Commissioner must form the view that
• a transaction, operation or scheme has been entered into or carried out;
• which has had the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on income or




'Every man is entitled to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts
is less than it otherwise would be' - per Lord Tomkin in IRC v Duke of Westminster [1936] AC 1
at 19.
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• having regard to the circumstances under which the tran'saction, operation or
scheme was entered into or carried out either it was entered into or carried out
by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in relation to a
venture of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question or it
has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between
persons dealing at arm's length under such a transaction, operation or scheme;
and
• the avoidance, postponement or reduction of the amount of the liability for tax
was in the opinion of the Commissioner the sole or one of the main purposes of
the transaction, operation or scheme. (This is to be presumed, in terms of
s 103(4) where the other three elements of the section are satisfied but may be
rebutted by the taxpayer on a balance of probabilities.)
The use of an en commandite partnership in the manner proposed in this report
must be considered to constitute a transaction, operation or scheme. It will also
have the effect of reducing the amount of the client's liability for tax on income.
That leaves two critical questions.
• Is the arrangement one that would normally be employed in similar
circumstances?
• If not, was the reduction of the client's liability for income tax the sole or one of
the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme?
The 'abnormality test' consists of two parts,
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• the first relating to the business purpose in respect of which the particular
transaction, operation or scheme has been entered into, and
• the second being the test in regard to the creation of abnormal rights or
obligations between the parties.
If the abnormality test is met , that is it is considered abnormal then the next test to
apply is the 'purpose test', which is to determine whether the sole or one of the
main purposes for entering into the particular transaction, operation or scheme is
the obtaining of a tax benefit.
It is submitted that the s 103 test should be approached in the following manner:
• First, the operation of a 'normal transaction' should be postulated, that is, one
that takes no account of the tax benefit that could otherwise be obtained if the
transaction were to be structured differently.
• Then the actual set of facts should be compared with those as postulated in
order to ascertain what differences might arise between the two structures.
• Then it should be determined whether there is any explanation other than the
obtaining of a tax benefit that could be advanced in respect of the difference.
• If no such explanation exists then the transaction does not pass the bona fide
purpose test.
• The reasons that are advanced, however, need to be plausible and reasonable
if a challenge under s 103 is to be withstood.
In the proposed structure, the benefits that are obtained are the following:
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• the en commandite partner is able to claim the tax capital allowances and
deduct these from its gross income; and
• by keeping the partnership in existence beyond the duration of the required
financing term (indeed possibly for the entire useful life of the asset) the
possibility of a recoupment is avoided, or reduced to a fraction of a percentage
of that which would have become payable had it transferred the asset out-of-
hand at the end of a normal lease that it had entered into individually with the
lessee.
Reasons that may need to be evident for a challenge in terms of s 103 to be
successfully withstood could include the following:
In respect of financial institutions the fact that
• the setting up of a partnership would secure more or better lines of business to
the financial institution;
• the client could administer the partnership and so save the financial institution
those costs that it would otherwise have borne;
• the client has specific knowledge and skill vis-a-vis assets of the nature sought
to be financed;
• for a limited risk the financial institution would be entitled to continue to receive
a profit share for the remainder of the useful life of the asset which it would
otherwise not have received.
And in respect of the client the fact that
• the financial institution is going into partnership with it could secure benefits
relating to financial and business advice;
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• they would be securing a source of financing for future assets which would form
the stock and future stock of the partnership;
• the partnership agreement could incorporate rights and privileges for the client
which he would otherwise not be in a bargaining position to negotiate were he
negotiating agreements in isolation;
• the client would share in some of the margin on the leases that he would
otherwise have not been able to claim.
In addition to the above, the fact that the financial institution 'kicks back' the majority
of any tax deduction or allowance to the lessee by way of a reduction in the lease
payable should in isolation prove an absence of a motive to purely take advantage
of the tax allowances and deductions.
Furthermore, and importantly, it must be remembered that most assets used in the
production of the income and in the course of a trade or business automatically
become entitled to the capital allowances.
Depending upon the financing structure elected, either the financial institution or the
client becomes entitled to claim these allowances.
Thus, for example, an asset forming the subject matter of a lease has the capital
allowances deduced by the financial institution whereas a client financing an asset
by way of instalment sale becomes himself entitled to the tax allowances. There is
no prejudice against the client for choosing one or the other of the financing options
available to him, and so consequently there can be no attack on the structure as
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proposed because it allows the lessor (that is the partnership) to claim the capital
instead of the client.
Comparison to Secondary Leases
The only real basis of an attack by the Commissioner is if he considers that the sole
or main purpose of the structure is to avoid the recoupment at the end of what
would otherwise have been a conventional lease.
If the situation is considered from the viewpoint of each partner it is obvious that the
main purpose for which the client is entering into the partnership is to obtain the
beneficial rate that the financial institution is able to offer him, and the main reason
that the financial institution is entering into the partnership is to secure more lending
(albeit in the form of a contribution). Thus each party has a good and valid (that is,
a bona fide) business reason for entering into the partnership.
Furthermore, it is accepted banking practice when dealing with conventional leases
that upon the expiry of a conventional lease a client is faced with a number of end-
of-lease options. He may thus have the option to
• return the asset to the lessor,
• purchase the asset, or
• enter into a further lease.
If he returns the asset to the lessor there are no tax consequences. If he purchases
the asset from the financial institution then depending upon the purchase price
charged for the asset there may arise a recoupment, either in the hands of the
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financial institution, or where there is a deemed recoupment in terms of s 8(4)(k) in
the hands of the client.
If the client wishes, at some stage, to purchase the asset but wishes to delay
payment of the recoupment then he may enter into a secondary lease.
The purpose of a secondary lease is to allow the client the cash flow benefit of
paying a small monthly rental (which he can deduct against income) to the financial
institution for that period that is required to write down the asset to a value, or
deemed value, which will, when purchased by the client, not cause a recoupment in
the hands of either the financial institution or the client.
Secondary leases should not constitute a breach of s 103 even though they might
be entered into for the purpose of avoiding or delaying the payment of the
recoupment as, according to the Duke of Westminster principle, the taxpayer has
the right to structure his affairs in a legitimate way in order that he pays the
minimum amount of tax.
Likewise, if the financial institution wished to remain a partner for the rest of the
useful life of the asset which the partnership owned then there could be no hint that
the partnership was avoiding the recoupment by not selling the asset, as there is no
obligation on any taxpayer to structure his affairs in order to pay those taxes that
might be legitimately avoided.
Accordingly therefore, it would seem that the structuring of the proposal along the
above lines will
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• not be abnormal,
• nor will it lack a bona fide business purpose, and
• the avoidance of tax will not be the sole or main object of the structuring.
Accordingly, an attack under s 103 should be capable of defence.
Effect of Ladysmith Judgment on the Proposal
In the case of Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (pty) Lld and another v C/~9 the Appellate
Division dealt with a 'double lease' property transaction in order to determine what
the true intention of the parties was. The court considered two well-known legal
principles,
• the one permitting parties to arrange their affairs so as to remain outside the
provisions of a particular statute, and
• the other to the effect that courts of law will not be deceived by the form of a
transaction and will rend aside the veil in which the transaction is wrapped and
examine its true nature and substance.
The facts of the case were briefly that the appellant had entered into a head lease
with a pension fund which in turn sub-let the property to a furniture company
wishing to erect a factory on the stand. The furniture company was a member of
the same group of companies as the Appellant. The sub-lessor erected a factory
for which it received a premium from the sub-lessee, the question being whether
the appellant, as owner of the land, should be taxed on the value of the right to
69 1958 SATe 229.
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have the buildings erected on the land in terms of para (h) of the 'gross income'
definition.
The court decided that it was the intention at all times that the appellant would be
entitled to have the buildings erected I but that by structuring the transaction in the
particular way this right could be 'shifted' to the sub-lessor and so avoid inclusion in
the gross income of the appellant.
The court looked past the agreements as they stood and exposed the transaction.
It therefore held that the appellant should have the value of the right included in its
gross income.
The ratio of the judgment was that effect should be given to agreements according
to their tenor but that where a disguised or simulated transaction is evident, it must
give effect to what is found to be the true agreement between the parties.
In this report, the proposed use of the en commandite partnership as a structure to
replace the 'Lessor Trust Arrangement' J or as a structuring tool generally, does not
rely on disguised transactions or false agreements for its efficacy. The partnerships
that are proposed would be genuine partnerships entered into for valid commercial
reasons and the documentation would reflect this. Accordingly the principles




En commandite partnerships provide a ready alternative to the 'Lessor Trust
Arrangement'. They combine a financial institution's requirements of non-
disclosure of participation, limited liability and the ability of the vehicle to act as a
conduit for the channelling of tax deductions and allowances with the attributes of
flexibility, ease of application and implementation, and simplicity.
For use in general tax structuring the en commandite partnership should be
considered more frequently as a vehicle for structuring.
The reason that it is not more widely used by financial institutions as a tax
structuring financial tool is primarily due to a lack of understanding of the
partnership itself. There is a dearth of authority on the en commandite partnership
and there is a corresponding scarcity of case law. As a consequence the bounds
within which the en commandite partnership can be used are shrouded in mystery.
Added to this is the fact that few legal practitioners have practical experience in the
structuring and application of these partnerships.
The inevitable result is that the en commandite partnership is generally not
promoted, in the first instance, as a tax structuring tool.
It is hoped that this report has gone some way to de-mystifying the mystery that is
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